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Summary 
Although the mass protests of 2010–2011 in Tunisia resulted in the introduction of a 
democratic system of government, the revolution’s demands for work and improved living 
conditions have not been fulfilled. Dissatisfaction with the country’s economic situation has 
been growing steadily since 2011, and Tunisians are pessimistic about the future. Since 
2015, this frustration has been erupting in ever-larger waves of protest that convulse entire 
regions and in some cases, the entire country. In 2016 there were even more protests than 
during the year of the revolution. 
This report quantitatively and qualitatively analyzes the development of socioeconomic 
protests in order to understand their far-reaching significance for Tunisia’s political stability 
and find ways to avoid further escalation. Although there is no immediate risk that the 
government will be overthrown, the new order could well be destabilized and delegitimized. 
The analysis of conflict data shows three alarming trends: The number of protests has 
grown sharply since 2015 and contentious actions have become increasingly fragmented 
and depoliticized. Instead of coalitions of protesters cooperating with civil society 
organizations and political parties, more and more protests have been held by unconnected, 
unorganized actors, most of them unemployed people demanding to be admitted into the 
labor market (and particularly the public sector). Socioeconomic protests have also become 
more geographically concentrated, with most taking place in marginalized regions of the 
Tunisian hinterland. A tendency towards disruptive acts of protest such as blocking streets 
and railroads has also been observed. 
To help us understand these developments, this report presents the findings of a case 
study in the Gafsa phosphate-mining region, which shows that the fragmentation and 
depoliticization result from the decades-long interplay of politics and local protests. Since 
the early 1970s, when the region’s largest employer, the state mining company CPG was 
forced to trim workers and welfare services, it has become more and more difficult for local 
school and university graduates to enter the labor market. They wait to get formal jobs with 
proper social protection for many years. In sociological terms, they remain “young”: 
dependent on their families, waiting to make the transition from adolescence to adulthood. 
Protesters continue to view employment in the CPG as their only solution. Their collective 
memory of golden times before the cutbacks clashes with a poverty that feels extremely 
unfair given the region’s wealth of natural resources and compared with the quite highly 
developed coastal areas. Protests are regarded as the only way to apply pressure to preserve 
jobs. Since Ben Ali’s overthrow, various governments have encouraged this view of protests 
by selectively awarding jobs to protesters – not based on their qualifications or any real need 
for workers, but solely to calm the situation. Under the dictatorship, comprehensive 
demands (such as programs to develop the region) were bloodily suppressed; today they are 
either ignored or palmed off with promises. 
This has led to unemployed people joining in ever-smaller groups to demand jobs for 
themselves. Protests have become self-perpetuating, and have created a low-level 
mobilization that can swell into regional or even national waves of protest at the slightest 
cause, such as a hiring decision that is deemed unfair. Neither political nor civil society 
 II 
actors have any influence on these protests – not even the organizations that worked with 
unorganized unemployed people before the revolution. One of them was the Union of 
Unemployed Graduates (Union des diplômés chômeurs, UDC), the only national 
organization for the unemployed. The UDC demands that the national education system be 
reformed and criticizes the lack of a political strategy for creating sustainable jobs, as well as 
the corrupt and opaque procedures for public-service hiring. At the local level, however, the 
UDC thinks about the protests the same way as the unorganized unemployed protesters, 
which results in holding many small actions instead of building alliances. The national 
leadership in turn tries to attract public attention to local protests, further weakening the 
representatives of the unemployed who inherently have few resources. Many unorganized 
unemployed people reject collaborating with the UDC because of these weaknesses. They 
also perceive the UDC as “political” and assume that it engages in clientelist practices. In 
fact, the UDC belongs to the left but rejects any clear affiliation with political parties.  
The most powerful civil-society actor that could possibly mediate between the 
unemployed and politicians, the Tunisian General Labor Union (Union générale tunisienne 
du travail, UGTT), does not perform this task, either. In the UGTT, there is a different 
dynamic at play at the various organizational levels. Locally, trade unionists demonstrate 
their solidarity with the unemployed, commiserate with their feelings of hopelessness, and 
regard long disruptive protests as the protesters’ only legitimate available resource. 
However, at the regional and national levels, aside from generally acknowledging the basic 
problem of high youth unemployment, the trade unionists are critical of the unemployed 
peoples’ unorganized protests because blocking streets and railroad lines interferes with 
business production and negatively affects workers. At the same time, however, the UGTT 
does not propose any economic policies that could help the unemployed. The great diversity 
within the UGTT, whose membership swelled after the revolution, seems to add to this 
difficulty, as well as the way the federation has generally cooperated with the various 
governments in order to maintain its political influence. Both members of the UDC and 
unorganized actors view this as a conflict of interest for the UGTT, which they do not 
consider a credible mediator.  
An important step to take to create social peace would be to channel the massive 
dissatisfaction into inclusive dialogue processes similar to those held for other issues in 
Tunisia. Questions about the state’s role in the economy and plans for regional 
development should also be discussed with jobless protesters and representatives of 
marginalized regions. Resources could be used to subsidize meaningful jobs such as 
improving the poor infrastructure instead of continuing to create jobs to calm the protests 
and accommodate supporters and relatives. Reforming hiring procedures would combat the 
pervasive corruption and clientelist networks and reduce protests against opaque recruiting 
methods.  
Tunisia needs many reforms if it is to avoid socioeconomic dissatisfaction from seriously 
jeopardizing its democracy. The country’s struggling economy must no longer be used as an 
excuse to neglect socioeconomic demands. Social peace can be bolstered through inclusive 
decision-making processes – which don’t have to cost much – and transparency, as well as 
by complying with the rules for allotting limited resources. 
  
Contents 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 1 
2. Economic and social challenges in Tunisia:   
Continuity in times of political change 3 
3. Socioeconomic protests after 2011 9 
4. Unemployed protests in the hinterland:  
Growing mobilization and fragmentation 16 
 4.1 The social meaning of unemployment in the case of Gafsa 17 
 4.2 How protest forms and mobilizing networks interplay with politics 19 
5. Civil society actors: Who can calm the protests? 22 
 5.1 Too weak, too “politicized”: The Union of Unemployed Graduates 22 
 5.2  The UGTT and unemployed peoples’ protests:  
The trade union federation’s ambivalent role 26 
6. Findings and possible solutions 30 
 
References 36 
 
 
 
 

  
1. Introduction1 
As the only country in North Africa and the Middle East (MENA) that was able to establish 
a democratic system of government following mass protests in 2011, Tunisia is viewed as a 
beacon of hope for the whole region. Although the political transformation has floundered 
again and again, a new constitution entered into force in 2014, and the parliament and 
president were freely and fairly elected. However, these success stories hide the fact that the 
revolution of 2010–2011 demanded not just political but also socioeconomic change. This 
was clearly heard in one of the most common slogans, “shughl, hurriya, karama 
wataniyya”–work, freedom, national dignity.  
Back in 2008, a six-month protest calling attention to poverty and unemployment had 
paralyzed the economically neglected Gafsa phosphate-mining basin. These protests are 
considered the precursors to the revolution of 2010–2011 that began in the economically 
hard-hit regions of Tunisia’s hinterland (Allal 2013). Not until the protests expanded to the 
coastal region and the capital Tunis, did the mass mobilization also call for democracy and 
political freedoms (Lesch 2014) – linking political change to expectations of socioeconomic 
improvements. However, since 2015, frustration has been growing, with bigger waves of 
protest bringing normal life to a standstill in entire regions and sometimes across the 
country. 
This report analyzes the development of the socioeconomic protests to understand their 
far-reaching significance for Tunisia’s political stability. It shows that the growing protests 
cannot be explained by the dismal economic situation alone: The responses of government 
leaders encourage and even stimulate certain patterns of protest. Since the economic 
situation cannot be expected to improve rapidly, this report shows how social peace can be 
created independent of economic reforms: by including the protesters in dialogue processes 
about the economy and regional development, and reforming recruitment processes to 
increase transparency and fairness. Another overthrow of the government is not imminent, 
but the protests could destabilize and delegitimize the new order, especially because the 
protesters and in the population at large are so dissatisfied. Surveys conducted by the Arab 
Barometer (Arab Barometer 2011; 2013; 2015) reveal that Tunisians are increasingly 
concerned about the country’s economy. In 2011, 90 percent of the Tunisians questioned 
stated that improving the economic situation was the government’s second most important 
 
 
1  This report is part of the multilateral research project, “Socioeconomic Protests and Political 
Transformation: Dynamics of Contentious Politics in Egypt and Tunisia against the Background of South 
American Experiences”, at the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt. The project is conducted in cooperation 
with the Arab Forum for Alternatives (Cairo, Egypt) and the University of Sfax (Tunisia) and financed by the 
Volkswagen Stiftung. The authors thank our Tunisian project partners, Prof. Dr. Bassam Karray and Samiha 
Hamdi, as well as Hendrik Meyer, the office manager of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Tunis, Michael 
Robbins of the Arab Barometer Survey, and the Tunisian Forum for Economic and Social Rights, Hager Ali, 
Giuseppe Campisi, Johanna Faulstich, Prisca Jöst, Ouassima Laabich, Yassine Nabli, Ronja Present and 
Amira Sahbi. 
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task, and people generally viewed the future positively. In 2015, however, only one third of 
those questioned were convinced that the economic situation would improve, with 60 
percent of those surveyed believing that the economic situation had deteriorated since 2011. 
Students and young adults were the biggest critics of the situation. The close interweaving of 
the political order and the economic situation can be seen by the way people increasingly 
voiced concerns about democracy as a form of government: In 2011, only 24 percent agreed 
with the statement that democracy is bad for the economy, is ineffective for maintaining 
order and making decisions. By 2013, this view had doubled among those polled, and in 
2015, it had swelled to 59 percent. 
Following the mass mobilizations of 2011–2012, the general dissatisfaction expressed in 
the surveys has been regularly expressed in smaller protests. However, since 2015 there have 
been renewed waves of protest at the regional and national levels, the largest of which were 
violent clashes by unemployed people in January 2016 that for the first time since the 
revolution spread from Kasserine in the interior to the capital. The main demands were for 
jobs and development of the neglected periphery. Although workers, especially unionized 
public-sector employees, repeatedly struck for higher pay and better working conditions, 
this report shows a general trend towards disruptive, unorganized protests for jobs. It 
further shows the problematic interplay of specific demands for more jobs for individuals 
and the state’s reaction to the demands: It sporadically yields by providing largely 
uneconomic jobs in order to get some peace, but does not even discuss plans to sustainably 
develop marginalized regions, let alone implement them. At the same time, the 
governments constantly invoke the poor budgetary and economic situation, which they 
blame on the waves of protest: They threaten public order and, along with the terrorist 
attacks in recent years, negatively impact on the investment climate. Politicians repeatedly 
call for protesters to be patient until the situation improves. 
In this report we argue that instead of playing for time, we suggest ways to end the 
spiraling escalation that build on research on social movements. Chapter 2 provides an 
overview of Tunisia’s socioeconomic situation and governmental economic and social 
policies since Ben Ali was toppled: makeshift, short-sighted reactions to pressing problems 
that have failed to make any noticeable improvements for the population at large. In the 
third chapter, we use protest and conflict data sets for a detailed analysis of the protest 
dynamics, the main actors, and their demands and forms of protest. A picture emerges of 
increasingly unorganized and disconnected protests with specific demands. The fourth 
chapter analyzes protests by unemployed people in a region full of contention, the Gafsa 
phosphate-mining basin, where the reasons for protests that go beyond demanding work 
become clear as well as why protesters do not network, create new structures or cooperate 
with organizations or political parties. This fragmentation makes it impossible for any 
organized player to exercise any influence on the protests and help to calm them. In 
Chapter 5, we examine the lack of collaboration of unemployed people with the civil society 
organizations with whom they cooperated during the mass demonstrations in 2008 and the 
anti-Ben Ali uprising in 2011: the only nationally active organization for the unemployed, 
the Union of Unemployed Graduates (Union des diplômés chômeurs, UDC) and the 
powerful Tunisian General Labor Union (Union générale tunisienne du travail, UGTT). 
Chapter 6 shows that this development is not a hopeless vicious circle and that incentives 
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can be provided so that protests will no longer be seen as the sole way to express 
socioeconomic dissatisfaction and pressure the government. Demands for work and 
dignified lives can be channeled into the system and efforts made to reach sustainable 
solutions. Reforms of recruiting procedures to create transparency and fairness should be 
continued in order to fight corruption and clientelism – thereby eliminating the most 
important catalyst for protest.  
2. Economic and social challenges in Tunisia:  
Continuity in times of political change  
Tunisia was long regarded as a country with great economic potential (cf. World Bank 
2014: 1), with its gross domestic product (GDP) exhibiting average growth rates of 4.3 
percent between 2005 and 2010. However, waves of protest in 2010-2011 showed that this 
kind of growth had not improved the economic well-being of the population at large. Yet 
the protests that toppled Ben Ali did not bring about far-reaching economic and social 
reforms. At first, all attention was focused on the country’s political transformation, 
which led to numerous short-lived governments and made it difficult to institute long-
term policies and reforms. 
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Tunisia’s post-2011 governments: an overview 
 
On 14 January 2011, Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali, who had been President of Tunisia 
since 1987, was overthrown. Then, in February 2011, continued protests in front of the 
seat of government in the Kasbah of Tunis brought about the resignation of the 
government that Prime Minister Mohamed Ghannouchi had led since 1999. Since 
then, Tunisia has had six different governments, the first under Beji Caid Essebsi 
(today’s president) in the first transition phase, which lasted until the elections for the 
constituent assembly in October 2011. The clear victor, the Islamist Ennahda Party, 
created a coalition with the secular social democratic-leaning parties, the Congress for 
the Republic (Congrès pour la République, CPR) and the Democratic Forum for Labor 
and Liberties (Forum démocratique pour le travail et les libertés, FTDL), better known 
as Ettakatol. Under the “troika”, two cabinets were formed with Ennahda prime 
ministers (Hamadi Jebali, December 2011–March 2013 and Ali Laarayedh, March 
2013–January 2014). Following large anti-Ennahda protests in 2013, a technocratic 
government under Mehdi Jomaa conducted official functions from January 2014 until 
parliamentary elections were held at the end of the year. In February 2015, a unity 
government was formed with the anti-Islamist alliance around President Beji Caid 
Essebsi, Nidaa Tunis (“Call for Tunisia”) and Ennahda, and the smaller liberal Afek 
Tunis (“Tunisian Horisons”) and the right-wing populist Free Patriotic Union parties 
(cf. Boubekeur 2016). The independent Habib Essid headed the government until 
August 2016, when he was pressured to resign in the face of President Essebsi’s 
consensus-building “Carthage Agreement” initiative (cf. Dihstelhoff/Sold 2016). He 
was replaced by Youssef Chahed of Nidaa Tunis. 
 
 
Prime 
minister 
(PM) 
Essebsi  
2/2011–
12/2011 
Jebali  
12/2011–
03/2013 
Laarayedh 
3/2013–
1/2014 
Jomaa 
1/2014–
2/2015 
Essid 
2/2015–
8/2016 
Chahed  
8/2016–
heute  
PM’s 
party Independent Ennahda Ennahda Independent Independent 
Nidaa 
Tunis 
Ruling 
party/ 
coalition 
Technocratic 
government 
“Troika”: 
Ennahda, CPR,  
Ettakatol 
Technocratic 
government 
Big coalition:  
Nidaa Tunis, Ennahda, 
Afek Tunis, Free Patriotic 
Union 
President Fu’ad 
Mebazaa 
Moncef Marzouki Beji Caid Essebsi 
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Since 2011, six different governments have been up against numerous economic problems. 
First, growth significantly declined: Although there was a recovery in 2012 following a 
recession in 2011, it has been stagnating between 1 and 2 percent since 2013 (Table 1). The 
service sector generates 60 percent of the GDP, 10 percent is derived from agriculture and 
barely 30 percent from industry.2 The GDP suffered from the sharp decline in tourism, 
which directly or indirectly accounts for some 15 percent of all jobs (IMF 2015: 11), and 
annually brought in about USD 3.5 billion before the unrest began. The insecure security 
situation in 2011 caused the figure to decline by a quarter. In 2015, Islamist attacks in 
Sousse and in the National Museum of Bardo were blamed for the hotel and catering 
industry shrinking another 17 percent (ESCWA 2016: 91).  
 
Table 1:  An overview of the economic data3 
 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Per capita GDP growth  2.5 -3.1 3.0 2.0 1.8 0.0  
GDP growth 3.5 -2.4 3.7 2.3 2.3 1.0 1.3 
Development aid (USD mil.) 550.4 922.1 1016.9 710.4 921.3   
Private remittances to Tunisia 
(USD mil.) 2063.3 2004.5 2265.7 2290.5 2346.6 1971.4  
Annual budget deficit as a 
share of GDP 1.0 2.6 5.5 7.0 5.0   
Unemployment 13.0 18.6 17.4 15.9 15.1 15.2 15.5 
Unemployment of university 
graduates 23.3 33.4 31.8 32.6 31.0 30.3 31.3 
Inflation rate 3.3 3.6 5.1 5.8 4.9 4.9  
 
The low GDP growth rate is accompanied by increasing government spending. The 
public debt has grown steadily since 2010, further restricting the government’s financial 
leeway (Table 1). While in 2010, the annual loss was 1 percent of GDP, by 2013 its share 
had increased sevenfold, with a slight reduction in the annual deficit first observed in the 
following year. This difficult situation is also evident in the government’s increasing debt, 
which rose from 40 percent of GDP in 2010 to 59 percent of GDP in 2016 (World Bank 
2017). The growing budget deficit appears even more dramatic when you realize that an 
increasing share of the budget comes from development funds, which almost doubled 
 
 
2  CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/. 
3  Source: IMF 2016a; World Bank 2017; INS 2012, 2015. 
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between 2009 and 2012 and now represent almost one seventh of the budget. This 
illustrates the state’s structural problem to cover its costs by itself, a very serious situation.  
One aspect of the budget deficit is state revenue lost from unpaid taxes, which is partly 
explained by Tunisia’s large share of informally employed workers. Some estimates put the 
informal economic sector equal to the formal sector (Aliriza et al. 2016: 9). Tax evasion is 
another problem for state coffers. The World Bank estimates that between 2002 and 2009 
tax fraud by politically connected firms cost Tunisia approximately USD 200 million per 
year (World Bank 2015b). Experts believe that the situation only worsened after the 
revolution (Rijkers et al. 2015). While nothing improved on the revenue side, public 
expenses grew, mostly for public sector wages. To be sure, post-Ben Ali governments 
inherited a public sector that represented approximately one quarter of the country’s GDP 
(Boughzala 2013: 14). However, after 2010, expenditures for public sector salaries again rose 
sharply – from 10.7 to 13 percent of GDP between 2010 and 2013 (World Bank 2015a: 10). 
This was less from salary increases than from large-scale hiring: Some 90,000 new positions 
were created in the first year after Ben Ali’s fall.4 The Islamist Ennahda Party was accused of 
hiring members and sympathizers when it belonged to the troika government.5 After the 
troika, however, the number of public employees rose again – to 591,793 in 2014.6 Public 
expenses jumped from TND 6 billion in 2010 (about EUR 3 billion) to TND 13.2 billion in 
2016 (EUR 5.3 billion), or 70 percent of the public budget (Muasher et al. 2016: 8). Increases 
were particularly sharp in the more than 90 state-owned enterprises where employment has 
doubled to 180,000 since 2011 (IMF 2016b: 20). 
Government recruiting was a political response to one of Tunisia’s most pressing 
problems: high unemployment. Although Tunisian governments managed to slightly lower 
the unemployment rate (from 18.6 percent in 2011 to 15.5 percent in 2016), among 
university graduates, unemployment had remained almost constant – over 30 percent – 
since the beginning of the upheavals (see Table 1). The continuous expansion of the 
educational system means that more than half of the working age population has a 
secondary school or university diploma or has completed a technical training program. 
However, the Tunisian economy does not have enough demand for such qualifications; the 
low-skilled jobs on offer do not meet the expectations of well-educated young adults. 
 
 
4  National Institute of Statistics (INS),  
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1vIRSbcJKTrPSDTyBrHcr_NKALkxSb-
pms4IocPBMo34/edit#gid=842205693. 
5  Those people suffered great discrimination and had no access to public resources under Ben Ali. For that 
reason, the jobs that Ennahda provided were viewed as a kind of compensation as part of the 2011 law 
granting amnesty to political prisoners and restitution for victims of the Ben Ali regime. However, the 
unions and Ennahda’s political opponents regarded this as not just a form of clientelism but also a threat to 
the neutrality of the public-service sector (Bellamine 2016; Weslaty 2013). 
6  National Institute of Statistics (INS), 
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1vIRSbcJKTrPSDTyBrHcr_NKALkxSb-
pms4IocPBMo34/edit#gid=842205693. 
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Companies also criticize the Tunisian educational system for not teaching the skills needed 
by the economy (ILO 2012). Women’s unemployment is considerably higher than men’s 
(INS 2015), although women are better educated (ILO 2012). Although their situation is 
improving slowly, it is still much harder for women to enter the job market than for men.  
Map of Tunisian Governorates7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
7  Economically developed governorates are marked in gray. Source: Meddeb 2017: 3. 
Along with economic stagnation and 
high unemployment, there are also 
huge regional disparities, particularly 
for young adults. In 2012, the 
Ministry of Regional Development 
and Planning published a study 
(ITCEQ 2012) with development 
indicators from the fields of 
education/training, technology, un-
employment, income, health, justice 
and equality. It shows an average of 
0.61 (with a maximum value of 1) 
for Tunisia’s northeastern regions 
and the south and west of only 0.40 
(Table 2). The Tunisian interior is a 
third less developed than the coast, 
with least-developed governorates 
considerably below this value 
(Kasserine 0.16; Kairouan 0.25; Sidi 
Bouzid 0.28). In the southwest, the 
values for education/technology and 
income/work, as well as for health, 
are 40 percent below those for the 
coastal areas. The disparities are 
slightly less for justice/equality. 
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Table 2:  Tunisia development index8 
 Education/ Technology 
Income/ 
Work Health 
Justice/ 
Equality 
Development 
indicator 
Northeast/  
coast 0.70 0.72 0.34 0.69 0.61 
Southwest/ 
interior 0.39 0.41 0.20 0.59 0.40 
Although from 2010 to 2015, overall poverty dropped (from 20 percent to 15 percent), this 
development did not affect all of Tunisia’s regions equally. In 2015, the poverty rate was 
below 10 percent in the north and east, and more than twice that in the rest of the country 
(INS 2015). In the south and west, unemployment was over 20 percent, compared with 
about 12 percent in the northeast (World Bank 2014: 39). When factors like gender and 
educational attainment are considered, the regional disparities become even more striking: 
The unemployment rate of well-educated women in the neglected regions is more than 
three times that of men. In some of the periphery, more than 50 percent of all university 
graduates have no jobs (ILO 2012). 
Since assuming office, Prime Minister Youssef Chahed has sought to stimulate 
Tunisia’s economy. He announced a new five-year development plan (2016–2020) that 
should pump USD 60 billion into economic development, with roughly 70 percent going 
to the least-developed interior (Muasher et al. 2016: 10). Key to the plan is boosting 
foreign direct investment through the adoption of a new law on investments and a big 
international investment conference (“Tunisia 2020”) that was held in late November 
2016. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are also urging that 
subsidies be cut. However, Chahed must carefully weigh the conflict that could be 
unleashed by cutting energy and food subsidies in exchange for short-term access to new 
financial resources (Aliriza et al. 2016).  
It is clear that Tunisia’s public spending is severely constrained and the government’s 
scope of action continues to shrink, although the IMF projects that in the long term, the 
economy will recover. While it is true that the government has started various initiatives 
to tackle the country’s neglected interior, it shows few signs of greater prosperity. The 
high rate of unemployment among well-educated Tunisians has only slightly decreased 
despite the addition of more public sector jobs. In fact, it appears that the creation of these 
jobs, most of which are said to be unproductive, largely contribute to budgetary problems. 
 
 
8  Source: ITCEQ 2012. 
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3. Socioeconomic protests after 2011  
The following analysis of protests in Tunisia is based on the Armed Conflict Location & 
Event Data Project (ACLED) database (Raleigh et al. 2010), which includes events of poli-
tical violence by state and non-state actors as well as events that could encourage conflict, 
such as non-violent protests. The ACLED is the only database that is currently carrying out 
a comprehensive, quantitative, ongoing survey about protests in Tunisia – using local, 
regional and national media in English and French, as well as reports by non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs). The events are manually coded.  
Like all data sets that primarily rely on newspaper reporting, the ACLED is subject to 
certain distortions: On one hand, various external influences, such as censorship, political 
pressure, intimidation of journalists and global agenda-setting may influence what gets 
reported. Protests also have to first generate a certain amount of attention in order to be 
reported on. The databank thus presents a collection of protests that were in the public 
spotlight – not a complete view of Tunisia’s protests. Furthermore, newspapers tend to 
report on events in which violence has played a role, and the use of only English- and 
French-language sources leads to the underrepresentation of smaller, more local protests in 
peripheral areas. These distortions should be kept in mind and are reflected on in the 
analysis, but actually play only a minor role in a chronological comparison like this one.  
Because the ACLED only provides limited information about individual protests, further 
research was conducted in English-, French- and Arabic-language newspapers on ACLED-
listed protests with regard to the actors, protest forms, demands, etc. A protest was coded as 
“socioeconomic” when the protesters’ main demands were socioeconomic. According to 
Weipert-Fenner and Wolff (2015: 5–6), the demands concerned productive activities 
(access to land, subsidies, credits and taxes), basic social services (public services, health, 
education, water, transport and price/tariff subsidies), income (wages, pensions and work), 
and worker rights (such as the right to organize and employment standards). Protests that 
made no socioeconomic demands were classified as “other” and were not analyzed. 
The last six years of Tunisian protests are marked by dramatic increase of 
socioeconomically motivated protests in 2015 and 2016 (Fig. 1). This is a new trend, both in 
relation to the other protests as well as in absolute numbers. Until that time, “other” protests 
outnumbered socioeconomic protests – except in December 2010, when the revolution 
started. Then in 2015 the figures were reversed, and in 2016, socioeconomic protests 
became much more significant. This period is also exceptional in terms of absolute 
numbers. The 124 socioeconomic protests held in January 2016 topped all records from 
2011, the year of the revolution.  
The wave of protests in December 2010, which represented the beginning of the Arab 
Uprisings, also included socioeconomically motivated protests in the marginalized interior 
that sought to draw attention to the inhabitants’ terrible economic conditions. These early 
protests, in which about a third of the protesters were less than 24 years old (Arab 
Barometer 2013), were soon followed by protests in the capital demanding President Ben 
Ali’s removal and political change. Yet even after Ben Ali was removed from office on 14 
January 2011, the protests continued almost unabated. One of the main reasons was that 
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members of the old regime continued to hold key positions, with one of Ben Ali’s old 
cronies, Mohamed Ghannouchi, heading the interim government. Political resistance to 
this caused a huge increase in protests in January 2011. Large protests accompanied the 
process of political transformation – especially until Ghannouchi resigned on 27 February. 
While socioeconomic protests are a recurring phenomenon in Tunisia, the transformation 
of the political system stimulated much more frequent mobilization.  
This scene hardly changed in the following years. Until its adoption in 2014, the new 
constitution was heavily contested, particularly the role of Islam in Tunisia (cf. Boubekeur 
2016). The debate was not just carried out in the constituent assembly but also inspired 
many protests between 2012 and 2014. The deteriorating security situation also brought 
people into the streets, while socioeconomic protests were generally less significant during 
this period. 
In 2015, the situation changed radically and socioeconomic issues became the focus of 
the protests: In the spring, collective bargaining in the public sector provided grounds to 
demonstrate about socioeconomic issues. The industrial policies of the neglected hinterland 
were criticized and the distribution of revenue from the oil sector was debated. 
Unorganized protests by unemployed people and informal workers demanding that their 
activities be regularized and legalized caused a big surge in the numbers of protests. The 
Libyan border closing and new customs regulations provided other grounds to protest (cf. 
Meddeb 2017). The rise in socioeconomic protests was accompanied by a decline in other 
protests. While between 2011 and 2014, an average of 169 “other” protests were held each 
year, in 2015 the figure dropped to 143. With regard to socioeconomic protests, the 176 
protests counted in 2015 greatly outnumbered the previous annual average (2011 to 2014) 
of 47. Although socioeconomic protests had already topped the previous record of “other” 
protests, in three months of 2015 they surpassed even the January 2011 record high of 
socioeconomic protests.  
The year 2016 began with a wave of protests that somewhat resembled those of 
December 2010. In the marginalized interior, protests about the worsening socioeconomic 
condition and the plague of unemployment quickly developed into a large wave of protests 
that also inspired solidarity protests in the capital. Although the wave of protests came to a 
rather abrupt end after two weeks, they had an effect well into the year and mobilized 
additional actors. The year 2016 was marked by a new increase in the number of 
socioeconomic protests. While the number of “other” protests was just over their annual 
average, the number of socioeconomic protests grew dramatically.  
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Figure 1:  Protests in Tunisia9 
The type of actors in socioeconomic protests had greatly changed since the unrest began 
in late 2010 (Fig. 2). In 2011 and 2012, industrial sector workers accounted for a scant 10 
percent of all protesters. In 2012, young unemployed people made up a similar share. This 
period was marked almost exclusively by mass protests by various types of actors. 
Beginning in early 2013 and continuing into 2014, the scene changed decisively: During 
that time, mass demonstrations accounted for barely half of all socioeconomic protests 
while employees from the service and public-service sectors began to protest. In 2015 and 
2016, there were more and more sector-specific protests, so that in 2016, large 
heterogeneous groups organized barely 30 percent of the socioeconomic protests. Then, 
in 2016 a large increase in young unemployed protesters was observed who, at 25 percent, 
accounted for the largest group.  
  
 
 
9  Source: Authors’ data collection based on the ACLED. 
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Figure 2:  Socioeconomic protesters10 
 
Both the types of protesters and their demands became increasingly differentiated (Fig. 3). 
Protests demanding fundamental change were gradually replaced by protests with specific 
demands, with demands for jobs and better working conditions beginning to dominate 
protests in 2015. The “jobs” category includes both demands for job creation and individual 
demands for employment. Demands for fundamental change and various demands 
dominated 38 percent of all protests, but continually dropped in significance until 2016 
when they were not even mentioned. Demands for better working conditions, which 
represented barely 10 percent of protesters’ concerns in 2011 continued to grow in 
significance until they peaked in 2015, when over 60 percent of socioeconomic protests 
raised these demands. This category covers issues like higher pay, as well as legalizing work 
in the informal sector and lifting labor restrictions. In 2011 and 2012, demands for job 
creation and positions for individuals dominated protests, then became less important in 
2013. In 2016, jobs again topped the protesters’ demands. Demands for economic reforms, 
mostly in protests in Tunisia’s neglected interior, played a decisive role until 2013. Although 
politicians generally still ignore the marginalization, since 2014, protesters in the neglected 
regions have been making more specific demands, among them job creation. 
 
 
10  Source: Authors’ data collection based on the ACLED. 
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Figure 3:  Protesters’ demands11 
 
Over the past six years, the type of protest has also changed, with an observable increase 
in disruptive protests (Fig. 4). Until 2013, the most common form of protest was the 
demonstration. Since 2014, however, there have been more and more blockades, sit-ins 
and violent protests. There appears to be a change from using peaceful protest forms to 
adopting unconventional and confrontational tactics. Approximately one quarter of the 
strikes, which in Tunisia are a constant phenomenon, are held in the industrial sector, 
with somewhat less than 20 percent in the service sector and in the public sector.  
  
 
 
11  Source: Authors’ data collection based on the ACLED. 
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Figure 4: The types of protest12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the marginalized regions where some 4.8 million people live, socioeconomic protests are 
held more regularly than in the coastal areas (6.18 million inhabitants). There were between 
5 and 73 protests annually per million inhabitants (Table 3) in Tunisia’s neglected interior, 
as opposed to between 2 and 26 protests in the coastal areas. The ratio of protests in the 
hinterland to those on the coast peaked in 2012: For each protest per million coastal 
inhabitants, there were 2.92 in the interior. Although this ratio dropped in 2013, starting in 
2014 there were twice as many protests in the marginalized interior regions. 
  
 
 
12  Source: Authors’ data collection based on the ACLED. 
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Table 3: Socioeconomic protests by region13 
 
Protests in 
marginalized 
regions 
Protests per 
million 
inhabitants 
Protests in 
coastal areas 
Protests per 
million 
inhabitants 
Ratio 
2011 22 4.58 15 2.43 1.88 
2012 43 8.96 19 3.07 2.92 
2013 19 3.96 22 3.56 1.11 
2014 20 4.17 12 1.94 2.15 
2015 116 24.17 64 10.36 2.33 
2016 349 72.71 160 25.89 2.81 
 
The protests in Tunisia never stop changing: Between 2011 and 2014, socioeconomic 
protests were a constant phenomenon but were less significant than other types of 
protests, with an average of 47 socioeconomic protests held each year and more than 
three times as many “other” protests (169). Socioeconomic and other types of protests 
were also held at the same time, with months of numerous protests alternating with 
calmer months. In 2015, the picture changed: Socioeconomic protests became a constant 
feature of everyday life in Tunisia; there were hardly any periods without some protests 
about socioeconomic concerns. Socioeconomic protests no longer appeared to be held 
just in months with lots of protests; they were held without regard to other protests; and 
2015 was the first year in which there were more socioeconomic than other types of 
protests (176 versus 145). Compared with an average of 47 socioeconomic protests from 
previous years, the nearly four-fold increase is striking. In 2016, there was another sharp 
increase: 399 socioeconomic protests compared with 172 “other” protests.  
  
 
 
13  Source: Authors’ data collection based on the ACLED. 
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4. Unemployed protests in the hinterland:  
Growing mobilization and fragmentation  
Unemployed protests have long played a prominent role in socioeconomic protests in 
Tunisia.14 The six-month-long uprising triggered by corrupt hiring practices in the Gafsa 
region in 2008 is regarded as one of the precursors to the revolution of 2010–2011 (Allal 
2013; Chomiak 2011). Employment was one of the key issues in the mass mobilization that 
led to Ben Ali’s overthrow. Since the rate of unemployment has remained high, it is no 
surprise that since 2011 unemployed people have regularly protested, given the greater 
freedoms of assembly and speech. When considered from the perspective of 
democratization, an increase in protests after the fall of a dictator is generally a good sign. 
What is alarming, however, is the sharp growth in protests starting in 2015, when political 
institutions were again functioning and it should have been possible to direct problems to 
the political system. Instead, there was a shift from protesting with civil society and political 
organizations to protesting in ever-smaller units. Furthermore, Tunisia appears to be a very 
divided country in which the protests of unemployed people mainly take place in its 
socioeconomically marginalized hinterland.  
These results of our quantitative analysis will be clarified through a qualitative study of 
jobless protests that can help suggest possible solutions. We selected one of the marginalized 
interior regions with one of the highest number of protests, the phosphate-mining region of 
the Gafsa Governorate.15 Despite a history that was full of contention before the revolution, 
in 2015 the region experienced entirely new waves of protest. In spring 2015, for example, 
protests brought phosphate mining to a standstill – something that hadn’t even happened 
during the revolution of 2010-2011.16 On 16 January 2016, a new wave of demonstrations 
and sit-ins began in the city of Kasserine and only three days later new protests were held in 
Gafsa that included unemployed people who used the anniversary of the revolution on 14 
January to draw attention to their unchanged predicament.17 This example shows how 
especially smaller, low-intensity protests can spread rapidly without any particular 
 
 
14  Our findings about unorganized protests by jobless people, the UDC and the UGTT are based on over 30 
interviews and focus groups with activists, NGOs, politicians and journalists in three visits to Tunisia 
(November 2014, March 2015, and October and November 2016), as well as participant observation at the 
World Social Forum held in Tunis in March 2015. Samiha Hamdi of the University of Sfax helped us to 
analyze the jobless movement in Gafsa.  
15  Between March 2014 and November 2016, the Tunisian NGO, the Tunisian Forum for Economic and Social 
Rights (FTDES) counted around 1,300 protests in Gafsa (see their monthly reports at: www.ftdes.net). 
16  Total productivity dropped dramatically: In 2010, 8 million tons of phosphate were mined, but only 11 
million tons between 2011 and 2015. Although the slump is blamed on the protests, rumors have it that the 
phosphate mines in Gafsa are nearing depletion; interview with a Tunisian political scientist, Sfax, November 
2016.  
17  Interview with a jobless activist in Redeyef, November 2016 
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organization. To better understand these dynamics, we investigate what sparks protests, 
their mobilization networks and interactions with the political class.  
First, a general comment about the protesters: When the Tunisian press reports about 
jobless mobilization, it usually associates it with “youth” – young unemployed people or 
young protesters, who characterize the movement. Although some protestors are in their 
forties, from the sociological perspective on intergenerational relationships, they belong to 
the category of adolescents. The young men and women18 who mobilize for employment 
have not yet entered the labor market, or more precisely, the formal labor market, since 
many of them do work in the informal sector. Some protesters consider themselves 
unemployed even if they are formally but precariously employed since most salaries are so 
low that they don’t suffice for an independent life. Most protestors want a government job 
in a public-sector firm or in public service because government jobs provide not just job 
security but also broad access to systems of social protection like health insurance and 
pension schemes. Such securities are often prerequisites to getting married, leaving home 
and founding a family. People without jobs are forced to remain “young” – dependent on 
their parents. Being stuck in the supposedly transitional phase termed waithood – waiting to 
be included and to become adult (Singerman 2007) – is the primary grievance of young 
jobless protesters.  
4.1 The social meaning of unemployment in the case of Gafsa 
Phosphate is a natural resource whose importance can hardly be overestimated: It is the 
essential supplier of energy in fertilizers that started the green revolution in the late 
nineteenth century and which we need to feed today’s world. Experts estimate that at 
current consumption levels, known phosphate deposits will be depleted in 30, or at most 
100, years.19 However, the huge importance of this resource is hardly noticeable in the 
mining region of Gafsa with its lousy infrastructure, healthcare services and educational 
opportunities. Until well into the 1970s, the situation was quite different. In the era of 
French colonialism (1881–1956), European companies mined the rich phosphate areas. 
After independence, they were merged to create the Gafsa Phosphate Company (CPG), 
which became a central pillar of the local economy. Not only did the new state company 
create jobs, but it also provided basic amenities, such as water and electricity, and education 
and healthcare facilities, as well as supermarkets and sports clubs. The four so-called mining 
towns – Redeyef, Oum Larayes, Metlaoui and Mdhila – that grew up around the CPG, were 
 
 
18  Virtually no women take part in unorganized protests, and although women belong to the UDC, they are a 
distinct minority. This is hardly surprising given the prevailing image of the male as the main breadwinner 
(Mansuy/Werquin 2015: 3). In addition, especially for women in the periphery, public protests are not 
viewed as an appropriate way to get involved – partly because of the risk of escalation. 
19  A Sustainable Global Society. How Can Materials Chemistry Help? White paper from the Chemical Sciences 
and Society Summit (CS3) 2010, March 2011, pp. 16; 
https://www.makro.ch.tum.de/fileadmin/w00bmv/www/Mediathek/whitepaper-engl.pdf. 
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privileged places. It became normal for at least one child of each miner who retired to take 
the open position in the CPG (Allal 2010; Hibou 2015).  
In the early 1980s, the deteriorating economy and rising government debt pushed 
Tunisian politicians to “modernize”: They switched from the state development model to 
the market economy. The unprofitable CPG was forced to make cost-cutting reforms. The 
expensive, labor-intensive underground mining was replaced by cheaper, albeit 
environmentally harmful, open-pit mining. Little by little, quasi-state functions that the 
CPG had fulfilled were outsourced. Early retirement programs and the practice of not filling 
job vacancies prevented the need to fire workers, creating no resistance but only gradually 
reducing the workforce. The number of CPG employees dropped from 16,000 in the mid-
1980s to between 6,000 and 8,000 in the mid-1990s and around 6,000 in the 2000s (Hibou 
2015: 305). State attempts to promote structural change failed partly because of inadequate 
financial resources but mostly because of the lack of any new model to develop the region.20 
A system of subcontractors who assumed functions previously assured by the CPG gave 
local leaders like the governor and the mining unions exclusive hiring rights, and the lack of 
transparency fostered the creation of clientelist networks. At the same time, state 
investments were flowing into new firms in the northeastern coastal areas. Starting in the 
mid-1990s, Tunisia’s sharp population growth increased pressure on the labor market, 
causing more stress. The first small protests sprang up when new positions were announced 
for whom only a few applicants were considered (Hibou 2015). In 2008, it became obvious 
that this development was seriously endangering social peace and when the CPG published 
a list of new hires in January, new protests were held. However, this time they were not just 
local expressions of disapproval. Demonstrations, sit-ins and street blockades spread 
through the mining towns. The regional head of the trade union federation UGTT Amara 
Abassi was accused of manipulating the hiring process to benefit his patronage network. 
Soon the protests also began to demand jobs and regional development. It took the brutal 
deployment of the security forces and the army to stop the unrest in June 2008 (Gobe 2010). 
While Ben Ali’s regime sent massive police force and soldiers to suppress the revolt, the 
seriousness of the situation also persuaded the government to increase its subsidy from a 
few million TND to TND 400 million per year. New companies were founded and 2,800 
jobs created in the field of environmental protection alone – but companies paid wages 
without creating real jobs and the new positions paid much worse than CPG jobs. 
Furthermore, Tunisian entrepreneurs who were close to the regime controlled most of the 
new firms. They could do whatever they wanted in their own companies as long as they 
hired people from the region. Wherever real jobs were created, especially in textile 
companies, the working conditions were very precarious (Hibou 2015: 318–319). In a 
nutshell: More financial resources were made available but there was no real structural 
change. At the same time, no regional or local developments were initiated. 
Decentralization was regarded as a threat to the central authorities.  
 
 
20  For an overview of the various approaches, see Hibou (2015: 315–316). 
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Developments prior to the 2011 revolution are significant today because the historical 
context provides a basis for comparison and helps us to understand the motivation for the 
mobilizations. Young people had vivid memories of the mining region’s golden age – not 
from personal experience, but from the collective memory. In interviews, all the 
unemployed activists vividly described what the region once offered.21 Another reason to 
mobilize was the region’s decline in comparison with the coastal regions, which had 
prospered in recent decades. Finally, the activists bemoaned their poverty in light of the 
region’s wealth of resources. They expressed pain and anger about these injustices, along 
with the conviction that they were entitled to CPG’s discontinued social services.  
This background information explains why protests were often sparked when new 
positions posted at the CPG seemed to suggest that employment was finally within reach 
and with it, access to the “lost paradise”.22 Yet hopes were then dashed because most 
applicants were never given a chance. Conversations with activists revealed that the longer 
they had been waiting to get a job, the more they felt like protesting. Some interviewees even 
claimed that having to wait a long time made them more entitled to get jobs. Identity also 
played a role: People from outside the region were not viewed as deserving local 
employment. The family’s rootedness in the town and the region were viewed as providing 
one with a claim to employment. However, activists also stated that corruption and 
clientelist networks negated their right to work. One type of preferential treatment came 
from direct payments to the people who select workers. The second type of favoritism was 
linked to social connections, with jobs only given to members of clans and families. Because 
poor unemployed people can’t offer bribes, only wealthy people get hired, while clientelist 
networks reproduce social hierarchies because only those with good connections can find 
jobs.23  
4.2 How protest forms and mobilizing networks interplay with politics 
Sit-ins are the most common form of protest by unorganized unemployed people. Usually 
they begin with demonstrations and disruptive forms of protest, such as blocking streets 
and railroad tracks. Although these may spread to other towns and sometimes even 
throughout the entire mining region, they do not lead to building coalitions or 
organizational structures. That means that most waves of protest do not create new 
mobilizing networks24 and eventually peter out. Small protests do, however, often turn into 
 
 
21  This paragraph is based on interviews with unemployed activists in Oum Larayes and Redeyef in November 
2016, as well as interviews in 2015 that are quoted in Hamdi/Weipert-Fenner (2017). 
22  Interview in Redeyef, 17 August 2015, quoted in Hamdi/Weipert-Fenner 2017. 
23  In interviews conducted in November 2016, multi-million dinar sums were named for a job with the CPG – 
incredible amounts, especially since it’s unlikely that a well-to-do person would be interested in working for 
a mining company. However, it illustrates how social exclusion is interpreted.  
24  This is also confirmed by the analysis of the jobless protests in January 2016 by Prisca Jöst (2017). 
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sit-ins that can last for months, although consolidated protests lose their disruptive 
character when just a tent is erected in the vicinity of the mining company, or a railroad 
track that is no longer used is blocked. Without banners and graffiti adorning the tent, the 
protest is easily overlooked.  
We must remain aware that although protests may remain on a low-intensity level for a 
while the slightest trigger will attract more people. Without needing organization or direct 
communication, the protest tactics will change, and quickly and spontaneously turn into 
larger protests. Calls to protest are not only spread online through social media, but also 
offline, through acquaintances and relatives.25 In the Gafsa mining basin, however, most 
unemployed protests remain fragmentary. The main units of protesters are small groups 
whose solidarity is often due to being blood relations or neighbors; they have no formal 
leadership or representative body. Families may be particularly important because the 
closest social networks suffer an unemployed member’s lack of integration and eventually 
their own resilience reaches its limits. Some activists derive their claim to work for the CPG 
from their families’ local or regional roots. Keeping the number of protesters small is also 
related to the attempt to squeeze jobs out of the CPG: The bigger the group, the less likely it 
is that a protest will reap a job for an individual protester.  
This way of thinking about protests can also be seen as resulting from political action. 
The 2008 protests did lead to more hiring by Ben Ali’s regime – just to calm the protests. 
The government incentives system responded to the threat of public protests by issuing 
concessions through the CPG to individual unemployed people in an effort to create short-
term stability. That spared the government the costs of a real development plan but at the 
same time, it also destroyed people’s interest in working with larger groups or 
organizations. Since “social” protests with specific personal demands, rather than broader 
political demands, were rewarded, collaborating with political actors and NGOs became less 
appealing. 
The declining appeal of cooperating with civil society organizations and political parties 
since Ben Ali was toppled seems to be a counterintuitive development. In 2008, 
unorganized employed protests that were mobilized along family lines worked with the 
Tunisian Communist Workers Party and the Harakat al-tajdid Party (the “Renewal 
Movement”), as well as with the Union of Unemployed Graduates (UDC) and NGOs like 
the Tunisian Association of Democratic Women (Association tunisienne des femmes 
democrats, ATFD) and the Tunisian Human Rights League (Ligue tunisienne des droits de 
l'homme, LTDH). Today’s isolated protests do not cooperate. Back in 2008, protesters 
cooperated with local unions, especially the teachers’ union, whose secretary general Adnan 
Hajji became the unofficial leader of the six-month uprising.  
 
 
25  Group interviews with unemployed activists in Redeyef and Oum Larayes in November 2016. 
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Today Hajji is an independent member of the Tunisian parliament. He agrees that the 
situation remains bad.26 Because his attempts to use his new position to mediate have often 
failed, he has come to reject disruptive protest forms.27 Other politicians also have no 
influence on the unemployed activists who vehemently distrust members of political parties 
on the assumption that they engage in clientele politics or exploit unemployed people to 
compensate for their own weaknesses and increase their own power.28 This also applies to 
the political parties that unemployed activists collaborated with in 2008.29 Protesters are 
disappointed by local and regional government representatives who are physically absent 
and perceived as inactive – as shown in the poor infrastructure and miserable healthcare 
services that push seriously ill people to drive many hours to seek treatment in Sfax or 
Tunis. Emblematic of the absent national government is the “delegate” or civil servant who 
is supposed to mediate between the governor and the subregion but who – in the case of the 
mining basin – doesn’t even live in the area. There is no communication about local 
problems and national politics – with members of parliament, political parties, or 
administrative bodies.  
This explains why separate groups of unemployed protesters appeal directly to the 
national government. When small groups manage to talk with prime ministers or relevant 
ministries, they consider their meetings successes and want to pursue these strategies. Such 
talks, however, are only about finding jobs for individual protesters, not about demanding 
regional development programs or decentralization. Politicians hardly do anything besides 
holding ad hoc and arbitrary discussions with separate groups. The two most important 
parties in the current coalition government, the secular Nidaa Tunis party and the Islamist 
Ennahda Party, have announced regional development programs but taken no steps to 
implement them, much less present any ideas about sustainable development. Various 
prime ministers and President Essebsi have repeatedly called for protesters to be patient 
because their problems cannot be solved overnight. Again and again, Essebsi invokes the 
risks that protests pose for domestic security, either by threatening public order or by 
presenting (Islamist) terrorists with the opportunity of blending into crowds of protesters 
(Marzouki 2015). The last reproach lacks any real basis – thus far – particularly since 
Islamists in general (even the moderate Ennahda Party) have not played any role in the 
protests.  
Analyzing one of Tunisia’s most important centers of protest shows that, at the local 
level, feelings of rage and disappointment about a situation that is felt to be unjust are 
reinforced by the collective memory of the golden days of jobs that came with social 
 
 
26  Interview with Adnan Hajji in Tunis in November 2014. 
27  http://www.realites.com.tn/2016/01/adnane-hajji-latteinte-aux-biens-publics-et-prives-constitue-une-ligne-
rouge/. 
28  Interviews with activists in Redeyef and Oum Larayes in November 2016. 
29  These include the Popular Front, the relatively successful alliance of leftwing parties that merged with the 
Communist Workers’ Party, which is led by the CWP spokesperson, Hama Hammami. 
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protection. When hiring announcements appear to offer access to public sector positions 
but are in fact blocked by patronage and corruption as well as the obvious dearth of jobs, 
these tensions erupt. Following the big protests, very small sit-ins and blockades have 
become the established modes of protest. While these do not seem to be disruptive, they 
create a kind of basic mobilization that can swell into bigger waves of protest at any 
moment. Mediation by political parties, members of parliament, and local or regional 
administrations clearly either fail or are rejected by suspicious jobless people. Various 
governments have reacted by allocating scattered jobs to small groups of protesters, which 
only encourages greater fragmentation. Since the number of protests is increasing and easily 
stimulate protests across the region or throughout the entire country, this short-term 
strategy does not seem to be worth pursuing. Given political actors’ inability to respond to 
the protesters’ difficulties and deal with them in the political process, in the next section we 
examine the two most important civil society actors who have already played significant 
roles for unemployed people in Gafsa and could serve as mediators. 
5. Civil society actors: Who can calm the protests? 
All post-revolution governments have continued to play Ben Ali’s game: When confronted 
with a mass mobilization, the prime minister or other relevant minister has made promises 
to individual groups of protesters that have only been partly fulfilled (Hibou 2015: 340). 
Their responses, however, make it seem pointless for the protesters to form organizational 
structures, which leads to the unemployed movement becoming fragmented. While the 
government has not yet been pushed to meet broader demands, this fragmentation has 
created a vehement dynamic that no organized actor can control. This section explores why 
the two civil society organizations that are best positioned to mediate have no influence: 
These are the only nationally active organizations for the unemployed, the Union of 
Unemployed Graduates (UDC) and the Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT). Local 
representatives of both organizations actively cooperated with the protesters in Gafsa 
during the revolt of 2008. Why did the collaboration end, and which new problems arose 
after their common enemy, the autocratic regime, was removed?  
5.1 Too weak, too “politicized”: The Union of Unemployed Graduates 
The Union of Unemployed Graduates (UDC) should have had the organizational and 
human resources potential to represent the marginalized “youth”. Unorganized 
unemployed people with and without university degrees mobilize much like UDC 
members. Although the UDC addresses the problems specifically faced by university 
graduates rather than those of all unemployed people, it does not advocate anything unique 
for its members. Why the UDC is not able to mediate for unorganized unemployed 
protesters despite sharing their concerns is explained below. 
The UDC was founded in 2006 by former activists of the General Union of Students of 
Tunisia (Union générale des étudiants de Tunisie, UGET) who held a sit-in in front of the 
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Ministry of the Interior to protest the lack of jobs for university graduates. When the 
government completely ignored them, they founded the UDC, which began with a few 
hundred activists and three offices. In addition to the Tunis headquarters, there was an 
office in Jendouba, the capital of the eponymous governorate, and a third in Redeyef in 
Gafsa Governate. From the beginning, the UDC was concerned with the country’s 
marginalized regions and got involved in the revolt in the Gafsa mining basin in 2008. With 
the trade union federation UGTT, the UDC offered organizational support to the revolt, but 
did not assume any leadership. Nevertheless, the Gafsa rebels chanted the UDC slogan, 
“shughl, hurriya, karama wataniyya” – work, liberty, national dignity – which was also 
heard during the revolution of 2010-2011.  
Only after Ben Ali was toppled could the UDC be officially registered and operate 
legally. Before that, like most civil society actors who criticized the regime, the UDC needed 
the UGTT’s support. The UDC was also connected to the UGTT at a deeper level: Like the 
student union, the UDC was clearly leftwing: Joining the trade union federation was 
regarded as the logical continuation of activism within a political camp, with the UDC 
serving as a bridge from student to worker activism.30 However, unorganized unemployed 
people used the UDC’s leftwing positioning to justify their refusal to join or cooperate with 
it: They avoided any “politicized engagement” which they stigmatized as political patronage.  
After 2011, UDC membership grew to 16,000, of whom 2,000 to 3,000 were active.31 It 
has a regional office in each governate, as well as some 70 local offices nationwide. The 
executive office and representatives of regional units try to coordinate their positions and 
operations in a joint committee while the local and regional levels mostly act very 
independently. In 2013, the UDC elected its executive board – the “executive office” – and 
their longtime informal president, Salam al-Ayari, to be the UDC general secretary.32 With 
more members in more parts of the country, UDC activities also increased. Since the 
revolution, the union has largely used Facebook to inform members about its activities. We 
systematically collected all UDC Facebook news and statements about protests between 
September 2011 (when the UDC first began to use Facebook on a large scale) and June 
2015, and categorized them according to demand and form of protest. More than a third of 
all UDC activities since 2011 took place in the first six months of 2015. Most of its demands 
were about employment and development or recruiting procedures in public service. 
Starting in late 2013, protests about how the state dealt with protests – repressing or 
ignoring them – grew in importance.  
The right to work demanded by activists is generally interpreted as the right to be 
employed in public service. Most researchers regard this claim as a remnant of the social 
 
 
30  This is the view of both members of these organizations and political opponents (interview with the head of 
the Ennahda Party’s student association, Tunis, March 2015). 
31  Interview with the UDC general secretary, Salam al-Ayari, Tunis, March 2015. 
32  The UDC’s next congress for electing its leaders is scheduled for 2017. 
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contract with the authoritarian regime (Hertog 2016) or as an “authoritarian bargain” 
(Desai et al. 2009), according to which, in the case of university graduates, political loyalty is 
swapped for a government position and the accompanying socioeconomic privileges. 
Whether unemployed graduate activists are ready to trade their newly won political 
freedoms for socioeconomic security is highly questionable. What is certain is that they 
want a more economically active state that creates jobs. They have the same demands as the 
unorganized unemployed activists, who generally seek jobs in the public sector or in civil 
service, depending on their qualifications.  
Another UDC demand regards recruiting procedures that generally fires up both UDC 
members and unorganized protesters. The UDC’s protest, however, particularly concerns 
academics – the competitive centralized exams, or concours, which are supposed to 
determine who is best qualified for the jobs. The concours system is regarded as being 
extremely corrupt. Moreover, political cronyism favors members of the parties in power, a 
prime example of which was the alleged hiring of 18,000 Ennahda supporters by the new 
Ennahda-led troika government. Activists also consider that too few jobs are allocated 
through the concours: Even if the process were clean, they’d still have minimal chances of 
success.33  
A closer look reveals local and national differences within the UDC. Many protest 
activities that are organized by its local offices, particularly the more drastic forms of 
protests like hunger strikes, resemble those of unorganized unemployed activists in which 
protesters demand jobs for themselves.34 The national UDC criticizes government strategies 
of allotting jobs merely to calm a situation as well as creating new measures like training 
programs and internships for academics that mask the fact that the young people are still 
waiting to be regularly employed.35 At the same time, the UDC’s national board is 
committed to providing support for local and regional protests.36 Politicians and public 
authorities particularly ignore autonomous local actions, for which the national UDC 
attempts to generate media attention through expressions and acts of solidarity. Activists, 
however, consider that the UDC’s efforts have significantly tapered off. This clarifies why 
the UDC is increasingly protesting the way the state ignores the unemployed – another way 
that the UDC resembles the unorganized protesters, who are rebelling against having to 
wait for improvements. 
The subject of education plays a special role in the UDC because of its focus on 
unemployed university graduates. In interviews, members of the executive office stress that 
Tunisia’s inferior education doesn’t prepare university graduates for the job market. It is 
 
 
33  Interviews and focus groups with UDC activists in Tunis in March 2015. 
34  Analysis of the protests using Facebook posts and interviews with participants in UDC-organized hunger 
strikes in Tunis in March 2015. 
35  Interview with Salam al-Ayari, Tunis, March 2015. See also Hafaïedh (2000). For an overview of these 
programs, see Angel-Urdinola et al. (2015: 71–73). 
36  Interviews with members of the UDC executive office in March 2015. 
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striking, however, that this subject is not an issue in the UDC’s actual activities – perhaps 
because it could prevent broad sections of the population from understanding or 
supporting UDC activities. In any case, unions, particularly those in the UGTT’s education 
sector, are very keen on protesting, which makes them natural cooperation partners for the 
UDC – as is the UGET, the students union, which begot the UDC. This indicates general 
problems within the mobilizing structures: Under Ben Ali, there was greater solidarity 
among the organizations and now that their common enemy is no longer there, both 
unorganized and organized unemployed people act more autonomously. The UDC 
continues to benefit from the support of the trade union federation: Hunger strikes are 
often held in UGTT offices and normally receive expressions of solidarity from the labor 
union. However, the UDC has a certain mistrust of trade unionists and fears that its 
mobilization will be used to pressure politicians. UDC activists claim that as soon as the 
UGTT sits down at the negotiating table to deal with the government, it demands pay 
increases for state employees so that there will be no funds left in the tight budget to create 
jobs. This conflict of interests reinforces the UDC’s feeling of being powerless in face of the 
too-powerful UGTT.37 In fact, the UDC has a certain distance from the UGTT that does not 
correspond to the rigid political stereotypes that unorganized unemployed people impute to 
the UDC and use as an excuse to not cooperate with it. 
UDC members mistrust political actors much as unorganized unemployed activists do. 
This may not be surprising with regard to the strongest parties, Nidaa Tunis and Ennahda, 
which are located in the economic-liberal spectrum. With particular regard to Ennahda, the 
leftwing camp strongly rejects Islamists yet UDC members also suspect that the leftwing 
Popular Front (jabha shaabiya) will rope them in for its own interests and neglect their 
demands.38 Nonetheless, the UDC is regarded as political by the unorganized unemployed 
interviewed in the Gafsa mining basin – which is why they reject any cooperation with the 
only national organization for unemployed people. Even unemployed graduates who join 
the UDC and could benefit from its lobbying complain that the UDC only pursues its 
members’ interests. However, the UDC’s obvious leftwing position makes it look like a 
“politicized” actor. The refusal to cooperate with “politicized” actors can thus be seen as the 
result of the interplay of protest and the selective awarding of jobs to “non-political” 
protesters.  
At the same time, however, the UDC is also regarded as being too weak to be able to 
achieve anything for the unemployed. In fact, the UDC does not have any resources to 
allocate, or only preferential access to distributing resources. Unemployment benefits in the 
“Amal (hope)” Program, which was started after Tunisia’s revolution, pay just TND 200 
(around EUR 80) per month for one year, and only to higher-education graduates – which 
makes it insignificant. Getting a job remains the only real solution for the unemployed. The 
UDC’s fragmentation at the local and national levels weakens the union. Instead of 
 
 
37  Interviews and focus groups with UDC activists in Tunis in March 2015 and October 2016. 
38  Interviews and focus groups with UDC activists, Tunis, March 2015; see also Antonakis-Nashif (2016: 139). 
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mobilizing on many levels for its more ambitious goals, local UDC offices operate like 
unorganized unemployed protesters but are based on pre-existing student activists’ 
networks, while the national UDC only supports local mobilization, which ties up resources 
and lessens its political clout. 
This is a vicious circle: As long as the UDC is excluded from decision-making and 
negotiating, it can’t attract more members who could help it become strong enough to 
effectively push for change. The national UDC needs to be involved in a dialogue process in 
order for it to be able to enforce its general demands, or at least get them on the political 
agenda. Government leaders have little incentive to negotiate with the UDC because it has 
no significant influence on the unorganized protests: It can’t stop or even block them. The 
UDC’s weakness is also due to its lack of confidence in political actors, as well as the 
strongest civil-society actor and its historic partner, the UGTT. However, the trade union 
federation also plays an ambivalent role in the growing unemployed protests. 
5.2  The UGTT and unemployed peoples’ protests:  
The trade union federation’s ambivalent role  
The UGTT is regarded as influential and independent – unlike most unions in the Arab 
world. This is because the UGTT fought for independence from French colonial 
domination (Beinin 2016:12–15).39 The union also maintained its strong political role as, 
after 2011, other trade union federations were finally allowed to form (none of which, 
however, represents any real competition).40 When the process of political transformation 
that started in 2011 seemed to have reached a dead end in 2013, the UGTT was able to use 
its earlier influence to help, which is why the union received the 2015 Nobel Peace Prize 
with the three other civil-society organizations of the “National Dialogue Quartet”. Its 
prominent position predestined the UGTT to help make the voices of the unemployed 
better heard in the political arena as well.41 However, a closer look reveals the tensions 
created by the trade union federation’s other roles besides that of being a political mediator. 
For one thing, by striking, the UGTT itself is a protest actor, which often results in it being 
blamed for all socioeconomic protests. Actually, although the UGTT does support protests 
by unemployed people – especially at the local level – the regional and national UGTT 
leadership are against them. This leads the trade union federation to attempt to mediate 
between protesters and government agencies but also, sometimes openly reject protests. The 
 
 
39  The Egyptian Trade Union Federation was founded in 1956 after Gamal Abdel Nasser overthrew the British-
supported monarchy, which made it susceptible to state control and cooptation from the beginning (cf. 
Abdalla/Wolff 2016). 
40  For an overview of the new associations, see Bishara (2014: 5). 
41  Comparative research on unemployment mobilization shows that despite conflicting interests between trade 
unionists and the unemployed, union support was the key to the emergence and spread of unemployed 
movements. For an overview of this debate, see Weipert-Fenner and Wolff (2016). 
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UGTT can neither drive the explosive protests nor create social peace. This is partly because 
it has been rather defensive about economic policy since 2011, as a result of the union’s 
heterogeneous membership, which makes it focus on defending workers’ interests: Since 
these partly conflict with the interests of the unemployed, the UGTT cannot also be the 
main actor to deal with the growing mobilization of unemployed people.  
The UGTT is a central trade union that is most active in the public sector and has 24 
regional offices, 19 sectors and 21 primary unions (Yousfi 2014: 320). Under the 
dictatorship, it was easier for the ruling elite to coopt the UGTT through the power 
concentrated at the head of the union. Despite that, the UGTT’s unity gave it enough 
political clout to be able to negotiate privileges and distribute these to its members. 
However, the trade union federation overestimated its power twice: In a general strike in 
1978 and in the 1984 “bread riots”, the UGTT openly resisted the regime, which responded 
with brutal repression. After that, while the national management refrained from public 
opposition, local offices maintained their autonomy – so the trade union federation was 
able to function as a kind of protective cover for all members of the opposition (Yousfi 
2015: 56–57). Elections for the executive office remained free and were generally left to the 
members, which conferred credibility and legitimacy to the trade union federation’s 
leadership (Yousfi 2015: 169). 
However, despite having a certain amount of leeway, the UGTT was involved in 
authoritarian practices. Local UGTT offices were central locations for protests but the 
regional level was often part of the authoritarian system – and was perceived as such (Beinin 
2016: 103; Netterstrøm 2016: 384, 388, 393). The 2008 revolt in the Gafsa phosphate-mining 
basin is the best illustration of the UGTT’s ambivalent role regarding protest: The revolt by 
unemployed people and their families against the corrupt recruiting practices of the main 
employer of the region, the CPG, was supported by local union members from the 
education sector. They were considered very leftwing and rebellious, particularly in 
comparison with the miners’ unions that over the decades had become part of the 
corruption and patronage networks. The 2008 revolt was in reaction to the way the UGTT 
regional head Amara Abassi, who was also a member of parliament for the ruling party, 
manipulated job recruitment. Over the decades, Abassi had used informal networks to 
create a powerful position for himself in the Gafsa region (Gobe 2010). The way the UGTT 
steered between cooperating with and resisting the regime was obvious during the mass 
protests in 2010-2011: For a long time the national leadership sat on the fence. Not until 
local cadres began to apply tremendous pressure did it grant them the right to organize 
strikes, while simultaneously calling for restraint. This did not prevent the workers from 
organizing general strikes in Sfax and Tunis on 12 and 14 January, which finally brought the 
revolution that had begun in the hinterland to the coastal areas and centers of power 
(Netterstrøm 2016: 394–395).  
After the revolution, in December 2011, the UGTT held its 22nd Congress, principally to 
elect a new executive board. A minority of its members pledged far-reaching reforms to 
make it more democratic internally and more decentralized, and to pay more attention to 
socioeconomic issues, particularly by discussing alternatives to the existing liberal economic 
model. However, the wing that prevailed placed less emphasis on internal changes than on 
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consensus and unity, particularly in confronting the governing Islamist Ennahda Party. 
Hussain Abassi, a member of the UGTT executive office since 2007, was elected general 
secretary. The former executive board appeared at the congress and excused itself for having 
supported Ben Ali, which it recognized had been a mistake. However, that was the extent of 
its analysis of its dictatorial past (Yousfi 2015: 152–184). In addition to the UGTT’s vertical 
lines of conflict, the union also had to seek consensus along other lines: the regions (Sfax 
against Gafsa), sectors and party membership (Yousfi 2015: 171). The UGTT has become 
even more diverse with membership increasing from 200,000 in 2011 to over 750,000 in 
2014 (Beinin 2016: 126). To paper over the UGTT’s heterogeneous membership – which 
could cause conflict – with its members’ shared identity as trade unionists, it became the 
informal rule to not discuss party and political preferences openly. Members were also 
urged to keep a distance from all political parties to avoid being used by politicians (Yousfi 
2015: 159).  
It is difficult to estimate the extent to which the UGTT’s practice of neutralizing internal 
political positions makes it difficult for the union to set a clear political agenda and use its 
political clout to defend it. The UGTT’s power is evident from the way it mediated in the 
process of political transformation, but the grass roots, whose members see no possibility of 
asserting their own socioeconomic concerns, are frustrated. In fact, the UGTT’s economic 
policy is unclear. Some members are firm critics of the neo-liberal economic model. At the 
2011 congress, demands to cancel economic agreements with the EU and the USA were 
made – but not adopted. As part of the “National Dialogue Quartet”, the UGTT clearly 
influenced the constitutional process, but it played no special role in debating the content of 
the constitution.42 In the country’s groundbreaking process of transitional justice, which 
regards economic crimes as offenses and views marginalized regions as potential victims, 
the UGTT did not contribute anything to the issue of social and economic rights (cf. 
Ottendörfer et al. 2017). Since 2011, the UGTT’s main achievement, which its leadership 
constantly mentions, has been getting salary increases for public-sector workers.  
The UGTT focus on workers is also shown by the way it only appeared a few times as a 
protest actor at the national level, and mostly called for national general strikes in times of 
political crisis: in December 2012, after Islamists violently attacked UGTT headquarters in 
Tunis, and in February and July 2013, after leftwing politicians Chokri Belaïd and 
Mohamed Brahmi were assassinated.43 Only in November 2016 did the trade union 
federation threaten a general strike for socioeconomic reasons, after Prime Minister Chahed 
demanded a two-year pay freeze for public employees to consolidate the budget. At the last 
 
 
42  For a comparison of the UGTT draft constitution of 2011 and the 2014 constitution, see Karray (2016). 
43  http://www.kapitalis.com/politique/13256-tunisie-l-ugtt-decidee-a-maintenir-la-greve-generale-jeudi-
prochain.html; 
http://www.tunisienumerique.com/tunisie-urgentlugtt-decrete-la-greve-generale-pour-demain/164332; 
http://directinfo.webmanagercenter.com/2013/07/25/tunisie-assassinat-mohamed-brahmi-lugtt-decrete-
une-greve-generale-vendredi/. 
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minute, however, the government relented and the strike was called off.44 Most strike 
activities were begun at the local and regional levels by unions in specific sectors: Education, 
health and transportation were particularly active. A central demand of the strikes was the 
improvement of specific working conditions and wage increases. Comprehensive reforms to 
the labor law and raising the national minimum wage were not up for debate.45 The UGTT 
national management defends workers’ rights, such as reform of the retirement age, in the 
political debate.  
Because of the strikes, numerous media have presented the UGTT as an obstructionist 
that risks the nation’s welfare for its own clientele. According to them, Tunisia’s difficult 
budgetary situation makes it irresponsible to protest for more salary increases, thereby 
paralyzing the entire country and further harming the economy (Benoit-Lavelle 2016; 
Bourial 2016). However, more precise analysis is needed: Public-sector costs have risen to 
become almost 50 percent of the budget46 – because of the many new positions that post-
2011 governments have not filled based on needs but rather to calm unemployed protests. 
The UGTT criticizes this practice; in an interview, the regional UGTT general secretary of 
Gafsa insisted, “No employment without development”.47 This clarifies the first division 
between the UGTT and the unemployed movement: Both are focused on the public sector 
and are competing for the same part of the constrained state budget.  
These basic conflicts are exacerbated by protesters’ increasing blockade strategies, whose 
disruptions particularly affect workers, according to union members. This is clear in Gafsa, 
where some workers were prevented from entering the mines, and where blockaded streets 
and railroad lines disturbed phosphate transportation. This interfered with phosphate 
extraction and processing in the regions of Sfax and Gabes, where a drop in productivity led 
to cuts in workers’ bonuses. 48 Nonetheless, local UGTT offices support protests by 
unorganized unemployed people – contrary to regional and national leaders’ explicit 
 
 
44  http://www.afriqueexpansion.com/fil-de-presse/3593-le-syndicat-tunisien-ugtt-annule-la-greve-generale-
prevue-le-8-decembre.html. 
45  See the statements by the Tunisian Minister of Social Affairs in June 2016 at: 
http://www.babnet.net/cadredetail-127274.asp. The same view emerged in the ministry’s data for 2012 to 
2014, which were available to the authors of the minister’s report. For 2015 and 2016, there are only media 
reports about the figures presented by the Ministry of Social Affairs. The UGTT provided us with an 
overview of the strikes in the first half of 2014, which we used as a random sample. What stands out are the 
repeated demands to found unions in the private sector—but only for a specific company or sector, not as a 
comprehensive demand.  
46  http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/tunisia/publication/economic-outlook-spring-2016. 
47  Interview with the UGTT’s general secretary for the Gafsa region, October 2016; the UGTT’s general 
secretary for the Gabes region and a member of the executive office expressed similar views in November 
2014. 
48  Interview with the UGTT representative of the Gabes region, November 2014, Gabes; interview with a 
member of the UGTT’s executive board, November 2014, Tunis.  
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rejection.49 However, the extent to which the UGTT’s executive office can or wants to 
control the local units is disputed (Yousfi 2015: 208). Despite local activists’ demands for 
fundamental structural reform to decentralize the UGTT and give the regional and local 
offices greater formal autonomy, this has not come to pass. In any case, local union 
members are acting more autonomously and identifying more with local concerns, 
especially protesters’ feelings of hopelessness. However, local UGTT representatives do not 
drive the protests. They also may not be able to stop them. In light of its failures in 
mediating, the national UGTT considers that it has minimal influence on local protests.50 
In summary, the UGTT mostly uses its role of protest actor to defend its members’ 
rights in different sectors and regions. Thus far, the UGTT has been truly successful in 
consolidating the relatively privileged status of workers and employees in the public sector. 
The UGTT demanded that the government draft a more comprehensive development and 
economic policy but did not manage to become a political creative power despite its clout as 
a mediator in the transformation process. Whether it could or should have assumed this 
role is disputed by members of Tunisian society and politics who are critical of unions, and 
by trade unionists themselves. In any case, the UGTT’s current strategic orientation has 
kept the union from being the social actor who can decisively calm the unemployed 
protests.  
6. Findings and possible solutions 
In Tunisia, socioeconomic protests have become much more important in recent years. In 
2015, they were the most common form of protest, and more socioeconomic protests were 
held in 2016 than all the protests in 2011, the year of the revolution. At the same time, 
socioeconomic protests were no longer held at the same time as other protests. The 
demands became more specific, as expressed in the spate of sectoral workers’ strikes, and 
there were more and more protests by young unorganized and unconnected actors, who 
primarily demanded state jobs for themselves. Likewise, protest tactics changed from quite 
peaceful to disruptive, which illustrates the potentially explosive power of the protests of the 
last two years. Most protests were held in Tunisia’s marginalized interior. 
This development of socioeconomic protests can be explained by growing dissatisfaction 
with the still suffering economy. According to the Arab Barometer, well-educated young 
people, whose rate of unemployment has hovered around 30 percent since the revolution, 
are particularly unsatisfied with the transformation process. This is shown in the increasing 
number of protests for employment, which had clearly increased in 2012 and accounted for 
most of the protests in 2016. The dismal situation of the neglected hinterland also feeds 
 
 
49  Interviews with the UGTT’s regional head in the city of Gafsa and the local union leader in Redeyef in the 
Gafsa region, November 2016.  
50  Interview with a member of the UGTT executive office, November 2014, Tunis. 
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resentment as the rise in protests in the interior both in absolute numbers and in 
comparison with the coastal areas indicates.  
A second factor that explains the growth in unemployed protests is the Tunisian 
government’s recruitment policy. In attempts to respond to the stagnating high level of 
unemployment, the governments of the past six years have created more than 200,000 
public-service positions – so that the share of people with university degrees working in the 
public sector has increased compared with their share in the private sector. This shows a 
certain readiness on the part of the government to improve the situation of well-educated 
Tunisians. Now, however, more people would like to take advantage of its willingness and 
are demanding government jobs – by protesting. 
The rise in socioeconomic protests also results from dying hopes that a democratic 
system of government will by itself improve the economy. In 2011, the Arab Barometer put 
the share of Tunisians who viewed the economy in a democracy as “necessarily weak” at 17 
percent, a share of opinion that grew to 49 percent in 2015 (Arab Barometer 2015). 
Democracy as such is not equated with a thriving economy, and the confidence that mass 
protests can bring about political as well as general societal and economic change that will 
allow all members of society to live in dignity has disappeared. Unorganized protests that 
demand concrete economic measures for specific groups have become commonplace.  
Yet why are there concentrated outbursts of socioeconomic protests, when protest 
groups continue to shrink and act more and more independently?  
The qualitative case study of unemployed mobilization examined one of the regions of 
Tunisia with the most protests, the phosphate-mining region in the Gafsa Governate. There, 
too, the protests have become increasingly fragmented, and are now made up of the smallest 
social networks – families or neighbors. They simply demand jobs at the government 
mining company, CPG, for the protesters. The analysis showed that the fragmentation 
comes from many years’ interplay of politics and local protests. Since the state mining 
company was first instructed to reduce the number of workers and welfare services in the 
1970s, it has become harder and harder for high school and university graduates to enter the 
labor market. No suitable alternatives have been created in either the public or the private 
sector, and the comprehensive package of paid labor and social security that came with a job 
at the CPG remains in the collective memory. At the same time, the CPG also reminds 
people of their region’s wealth, which local residents would like to share, and how deprived 
their region is when compared with the country’s coastal areas. Since no government either 
before or since the overthrow of Ben Ali has successfully implemented any plans to develop 
the region, whenever the disgruntlement grows too loud, the political response is still to 
create jobs in the CPG (and its subsidiaries) – jobs that are largely viewed as inefficient and 
unsustainable. This approach buys short-term stability but also stimulates very 
individualized protests, some of which may run for months and eventually lose their 
original disruptive character. Nevertheless, they create a form of permanent basic 
mobilization that, as the protests in 2016 illustrated, need just a small trigger to rapidly 
develop into a large wave of protests that are hard to control. The political explosive force of 
these protests became clear in 2008 and 2010-2011.  
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Who can have a calming effect on these protests and help to steer their demands to the 
political system where pressure can be applied to develop sustainable solutions?  
The two civil society organizations that cooperated with the unemployed in Gafsa before 
the revolution were able to develop other organizing capacities after 2011. The first potential 
cooperation partner is the Union of Unemployed Graduates (UDC), which, after the 
revolution, grew in terms of members and nationwide offices and became more democratic. 
Its general secretary had a strong media presence and represented what the national UDC 
criticizes about previous policies, educational system and lack of strategies for creating 
sustainable jobs – as well as the corrupt and opaque public-service recruitment procedures. 
The UDC’s obvious inability to affect the unorganized unemployment protests has internal 
and external reasons. Local UDC offices behave quite autonomously, using strategies that 
strongly resemble those of the unorganized unemployed who use hunger strikes and 
protracted sit-ins to demand jobs for themselves. Much of the UDC’s energy is absorbed 
trying to get attention for such actions in order to build pressure and help the actions to 
succeed, as well as protesting government repression of UDC members. These 
preoccupations make the UDC appear weak and have deterred unorganized unemployed 
graduates from joining. Added to that is the broad perception that the UDC is a 
“politicized” actor. Although the UDC clearly belongs to the leftwing of civil society 
organizations, its members are extremely mistrustful of political parties, including the 
leftwing Popular Front. They have the same fear of being exploited by their real cooperation 
partner, the UGTT trade union federation because of its ambivalence about the 
unemployed movement. Here, too, a different dynamic is seen at the local level than at the 
regional and national levels. On the ground, union members express solidarity with the 
unemployed, whose hopelessness they share and whose long, disruptive protests are viewed 
as their only available legitimate resource to exert pressure and eventually be able to leave 
the state of continuous waiting. The regional and national levels of the UGTT react 
differently: Besides generally acknowledging the basic problem of high youth 
unemployment, they criticize the unorganized unemployed protests, especially because 
blocking streets and railroad lines blocks workers, too. In Gafsa, these protests disrupt 
phosphate mining and can even bring it to a standstill, disturbing other workers in the 
production chain. At the same time, the UGTT proposes no clear economic policies to help 
the unemployed. Its heterogeneity, which increased after the revolution, seems to make this 
harder, as well as the UGTT’s political influence, which resulted from its cooperation with 
previous governments. Unemployed activists consider that the UGTT represents only the 
interests of its members, especially those in the public sector for whom it seeks pay raises 
that would have to be financed from already strapped state coffers – leaving no funds to 
create new jobs.  
How can solutions to this messy situation be found that prevent Tunisia’s young 
democracy from being destabilized through repeated socioeconomic protests?  
One important step would be channeling the massive dissatisfaction into inclusive 
dialogue processes. The 2012 negotiations between the employer organization, the Tunisian 
Confederation of Industry, Trade and Handicrafts (Union tunisienne de l’industrie, du 
commerce et de l’artisanat, UTICA), the UGTT and the government, which ended with a 
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“Social Contract” that was signed on the heavily symbolic 14 January 2013, the second 
anniversary of the revolution, could serve as a model. The signatories defined the basic 
principles and goals of the labor market and the social security system that were to be 
developed in working groups. They further agreed to institutionalize the negotiations in the 
“National Social Dialogue Council”.51 Something similar could be considered: a broader 
framework for publicly discussing central questions about Tunisia’s socioeconomic order 
that integrates unemployed people. Instead of the usual discussion about how to boost 
foreign investment, this dialogue would include explicit talk about the state’s engagement in 
the economy. Should the state assume a stronger role as an employer or should it 
concentrate on being a regulator? These questions must be frankly discussed because the 
unemployed mobilization demands government and public sector jobs. Politicians must 
speak clearly about whether and how they want to develop the public sector, or if they could 
get the private sector to create more jobs with good working conditions – instead of, or 
alongside, the government. Private-sector jobs must provide social protection and pay well 
enough for employees to live on their own and be able to make the transition from 
adolescence to autonomous adulthood. This approach could pave the way to ending 
waithood, which is the key concern of unemployed protests, although it has not been 
articulated as a demand.  
A serious social dialogue requires the participation of organized unemployed actors who 
can speak and assert themselves so that they do not always have to rely on the UGTT in 
negotiations and dialogue fora. This has already been proven inexpedient. Right now, only 
the UDC is available for such dialogue, but as this report shows, it is not regarded as a 
proper representative of unorganized unemployed people. What would happen if the UDC 
were integrated into a dialogue forum? Could that motivate more unemployed people to 
organize within the UDC? Or would this inspire them to found new associations by 
showing that it is worthwhile to create structures and organizations rather than to continue 
to protest in the smallest groups until a job materializes? Whether these positive 
developments actually come to pass requires the political will to cede some power by 
including people who are mobilized by socioeconomic grievances in decision-making 
processes – so that they do not just articulate and pursue their interests by protesting.  
Dialogue processes could also help the regions a great deal. The protests have clearly 
shifted to the neglected hinterland where protesters have no government mediator to 
facilitate communication between local protests and national political figures. Since there 
have been no municipal or governorate elections since 2011, some administrative bodies are 
headed by elites from the Ben Ali era or by newly appointed but unelected people who often 
have no real legitimacy. Political decentralization is the first step toward social dialogue at 
the regional level, between the regions, and between regions and the national government.  
 
 
51  The relevant law has been stuck in Parliament since 2014 (Dahmani 2016). 
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Specific measures to help the regions should be combined with institutional integration 
in dialogue fora that can pursue long-term sustainable goals and have an immediate 
calming effect. Regional development funds have already been planned and partly 
implemented, but unemployed people who applied for funds to found their own 
companies, complained that the regulations are extremely complicated and the award 
procedure was susceptible to corruption.52 Given the obvious demand, making the process 
transparent and accessible would be a meaningful step. This report has shown that the 
region’s wealth of resources and low standard of living makes inhabitants indignant. If the 
regional share of around 25 percent of the profits that is discussed from time to time were 
actually channeled into sustainable development processes, it could finance basic 
infrastructure like streets, water and electricity that only the state can provide and combat 
the impression that people in the hinterland have of being both exploited and neglected. 
The measures might be short-term but they would create meaningful income-producing 
activity – unlike the inefficient positions in state companies and public service that post-
2011 governments have created. 
Finally, the hiring process must be reformed. Opacity opens the floodgates to corruption 
and clientelism. Even when hiring occurs normally, negative decisions are suspect and 
rejected. For that reason, recruiting again and again triggers unemployed protests – 
organized and unorganized, by people with and without university degrees. In order to 
counteract the (perceived) unfair access to the labor market, hiring procedures must be 
made as transparent as possible. Since recruiting is believed to be manipulated by local and 
regional powers in politics, administrative bodies and the union, the practice of integrating 
actors from other regions or the national level who are viewed as trustworthy and 
independent should help prevent the abuse of power and nepotism.  
Such reforms would demonstrate the political will to crack down on clientelist 
structures. Thus far, there has been precious little of that. Instead of criminally prosecuting 
profiteers of the old regime, the Nidaa Tunis–Ennahda coalition proposed a law on 
“economic and financial reconciliation” (projet de loi sur la réconciliation économique et 
financière) to grant amnesty for public officials and state employees accused of financial 
corruption and misuse of state funds under Ben Ali, in exchange of a simple fine. This bill 
was regarded as an attempt to hinder the process of transitional justice in Tunisia, which 
had included economic crimes and corruption in the mandate of the Truth and Dignity 
Commission (Salehi 2016). Legislators claimed that voluntary declarations and 
compensation payments were a faster, more discreet way to come to terms with the past. 
However, that would neither challenge the wealth and ownership structures inherited from 
the Ben Ali regime, nor solve any crimes nor bring the perpetrators to justice. With union 
support, the campaign “Manich msamah” (“I do not forgive”) mobilized protest against the 
 
 
52  Interviews with unorganized unemployed activists in Oum Larayes, November 2016. The manager of the 
local FTDES office in Redeyef confirmed the significant bureaucratic hurdles in November 2016. 
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proposed reconciliation law and has thus far prevented its passage.53 This bill is seen as the 
proof that the current government doesn’t want to change anything in either old or new 
corrupt clientelist networks, an impression that must be refuted through clear actions. 
Reforming the hiring procedure that autocratic elites use to consolidate their control could 
make an important symbolic contribution – and would practically combat clientelist 
networks. This in turn could help to calm the growing waves of uncontrollable protest that 
are accompanied by increasing skepticism about democracy as a form of government. 
Above all, the impression must be countered that nothing has changed besides free elections 
and greater political freedoms. Given the security challenges posed by Islamist terrorism, 
social peace is indispensable for the political stability of Tunisia’s young democracy. This is 
why political actors must dedicate their undivided attention and resources to promoting 
social justice. The common view that socioeconomic demands must take the back seat 
because of a faltering economy has to give way to the realization that inclusive decision-
making processes, transparency and following the rules for allotting limited resources help 
create social peace. 
 
 
53  http://nawaat.org/portail/2016/07/13/manich-msamah-appelle-a-reprendre-la-rue/. 
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